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•• ABSTRACT The Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) is a unification of smart healthcare devices, tools, and
•

software, which connect various patients and other users to the healthcare information system through the
networking technology. It further reduces unnecessary hospital visits and the burden on healthcare systems by
connecting the patients to their healthcare experts (i.e., doctors) and allows secure transmission of healthcare
data over an insecure channel (e.g., the Internet). Since Artificial Intelligence (AI) has a great impact on the
performance and usability of an information system, it is important to include its modules in a healthcare
information system, which will be very helpful for the prediction of some phenomena, such as chances of
getting a heart attack and possibility of a tumor, from the collected and analysed healthcare data. To mitigate
these issues, in this paper, a new AI-enabled lightweight, secure communication scheme for an IoMT
environment has been designed and named as ASCP-IoMT, in short. The security analysis of ASCP-IoMT
is performed in different ways, such as an informal way and a formal way (through the random oracle
model). ASCP-IoMT performs better than other similar schemes and provides superior security with extra
functionality features as compared those for the existing state of art solutions. A practical implementation of
ASCP-IoMT is also performed in order to measure its impact on various network performance parameters.
The end to end delay values of ASCP-IoMT are 0.01587, 0.07440 and 0.17097 seconds and the throughput
values of ASCP-IoMT are 5.05, 10.88 and 16.41 bits per second (bps) under the different considered
cases, respectively. For AI-based Big data analytics phase, the values of computation time (seconds) for
decision tree, support vector machine (SVM), and logistic regression are measured as 0.19, 0.23, and 0.27,
respectively. Moreover, the different values of accuracy for decision tree, SVM and logistic regression are
84.24%, 87.57%, and 85.20%, respectively. From these values, it is clear that decision tree method requires
less time than the other considered techniques, whereas accuracy is high in case of SVM.

.• INDEX TERMS Internet of Medical Things (IoMT), authentication, key agreement, artificial intelligence
•

(AI), security.
I. INTRODUCTION
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and

e.

approving it for publication was Adnan M. Abu-Mahfouz
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Internet of Medical Things (IoMT) envisions a network
of smart healthcare devices and users, which use some
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wireless communication technology for the exchange of
healthcare data. As the cost and prices of healthcare for
various services are now increasing with the growing population, it is important to mention that the combination of
IoMT and healthcare can ameliorate the quality of life and
provide better care [1], [2]. This can be used to create
more cost-effective systems of healthcare [3]. Some of the
potential applications of IoMT include complete real-time
monitoring of patients, patient information management,
medical equipment and drug monitoring, medical device and
pharmaceuticals anti-counterfeiting, medical waste information management, medical emergency management, remote
surgery, medical equipment and drug tracking and medicine
and sample collection through drones [4], [5].
A. MOTIVATION

The healthcare data can be stored over the cloud for further
analysis and prediction. In such cases, for the prediction and
outcomes, we can use the AI-enabled Big data analytic methods at the authorized cloud server(s). This process is essentially required to predict the health conditions (i.e., chances of
getting a heart attack, chances of getting a diabetic shock and
possibility of a tumor, etc.) [6]–[8]. Furthermore, although
IoMT supports various types of applications as discussed
earlier, it also suffers from different security and privacy
issues. This may cause the problems with secure transmission
and storage of the sensitive healthcare data. The present protocols lack in security and functionality features. The existing
protocols are vulnerable to various attacks. Moreover, they
do not have important phases, like key revocation phase and
AI-enabled big data analytics phase. Thus, it is essential to
provide a robust security protocol for the secure communication in an IoMT environment, which should overcome the
existing issues. This motivates us to design a new AI-enabled
secure communication scheme for the IoMT environment.
B. RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS

The following are the research contributions of the paper:
•

•

•

•

A new AI-enabled lightweight, secure communication
scheme for IoMT environment (in short ASCP-IoMT)
is proposed. It provides secure communications among
Internet of Things (IoT)-enabled implantable medical
devices and personal servers, and personal servers and
cloud servers through the provided authentication and
key establishment procedure.
The given network model and threat model provide the
details of the associated network arrangement of the
devices and users of IoMT and information security
threats of the IoMT.
The performed security analysis confirms the security of
ASCP-IoMT against different potential passive as well
as active attacks.
The comparison of ASCP-IoMT with the other similar
schemes is also performed. It indicates that ASCP-IoMT
performs better than the other similar schemes.
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The practical implementation of ASCP-IoMT is then
provided to find out its influence on network performance parameters of the system.

C. PAPER OUTLINE

The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Various related
security schemes in the domain of IoMT are discussed in
Section II. The associated system models of ASCP-IoMT are
provided in Section III. The various phases of ASCP-IoMT
are elaborated in Section IV. The security of ASCP-IoMT is
provided in Section V. The comparison of ASCP-IoMT
and other similar schemes is then provided in Section VI.
The practical implementation of ASCP-IoMT is also done
in Section VII. At the last, the paper is concluded in
Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK

Wazid et al. [4] proposed a private-blockchain based framework for secure communication in an IoT-enabled droneaided healthcare environment. Camara et al. [9] discussed the
safety, security, and privacy risk associated with the use of
IMDs.
Cano and Canavate-Sanchez [10] proposed a
dual-signature based elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) to protect the privacy in the IoMT environment. Wang et al. [11] designed a fog-based access control
method to ensure high-level privacy in the cloud/fog-based
IoMT environment. However, in their scheme, important
security and functionality features like mutual authentication, absence of key agreement, etc., were not provided.
Alsubaei et al. [12] presented a web-based IoMT security
assessment method.
Jang et al. [13] proposed a hybrid security scheme that
uses both heterogeneous cryptosystems, such as symmetric
and asymmetric (public) key cryptographic techniques. However, their scheme fails to provide proper security for the
healthcare data exchange.
He and Zeadally [14] presented an authentication mechanism by using the ambient intelligence, specifically for
an Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) system. Their scheme
helped in the monitoring of healthcare data and it also provided tele-health care services. Merabet et al. [15] presented
Machine-to-Machine (M2M) and Machine-to-Cloud (M2C)
methods, which were required in the IoT-based healthcare
systems. However, their presented schemes did not support
essential features, like dynamic controller node addition and
medical device addition.
Most of the schemes discussed in this section lack in
security and functionality features and do not have essential
features like AI-based big data analytics. Thus, it is important
to provide some AI-based security mechanism for secure
healthcare data exchange inside an IoMT environment.
III. SYSTEM MODELS

In this section, we discuss the associated network model and
attack model of the proposed ASCP-IoMT algorithm/method.
57991
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FIGURE 1. Network model of ASCP-IoMT.

A. NETWORK MODEL

In the network model of ASCP-IoMT provided in Figure 1,
there is a patient, who is implanted with some medical devices
(IMDs), i.e., neurostimulator, cardiac pacemaker, etc. There
is also a deployed personal server, which collects data from
IMDs through some wireless communication method. Various wireless communication technologies along with protocols can be utilized in order to connect the IoT-enabled
smart devices [16]. Some of these include 1) Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6), over Low power Wireless Personal
Area Networks (6LoWPAN), 2) ZigBee, 3) Bluetooth Low
Energy (BLE), and 4) Z-Wave and Near Field Communication (NFC). 6loWPAN is the most commonly used standard in
IoT communication protocols, because it is based on IP-based
standard internetworking protocol and can be connected
directly with other IP networks without any intermediate
networking entities such as proxies and translation gateways.
ZigBee relies on low-power wireless IEEE802.15.4 networking standard, which also supports various types of topologies including star, mesh, star tree network topologies. BLE
is intended for designing and enhancing the short-range,
low bandwidth, and low latency for IoT-based applications.
On the other hand, NFC is a very short-range wireless communication mechanism which has the ability to transfer the
data among IoT devices.
The data, which is collected by the personal server, is forwarded to the associated cloud server via an access point.
The cloud servers stores, process, and analyse the received
healthcare data of the patients. There are also some users
(i.e., doctors) who want to access the health-related data of
the patient. A trusted authority is required to deploy for the
registration of the various devices, i.e., IMDs, personal server,
57992

cloud servers and the users. The healthcare data of the patient
can be accessed by the users from the associated cloud server
after the execution of required steps of the authentication
technique.
The cloud servers are resource-rich entities and have high
processing, computation and storage capabilities. All the
messages among the communicating devices and users are
exchanged in a secure way with the help of established
session keys. Here, it is also important to mention that
the deployed IMDs are resource constrained entities, which
have very low high processing, computation and storage
capabilities. Therefore, a deployed authentication and key
establishment scheme should use lightweight cryptographic
operations such as hash and XOR operations.
In the proposed ASCP-IoMT, we only consider the use
of lightweight cryptographic operations. The deployed cloud
servers store a huge amount of healthcare data, which can be
used in various health-related predictions. For the prediction
and outcomes, we can use the AI-enabled big data analytics
methods at the authorized cloud server. This process is essentially required to predict the health conditions (i.e., chances
of getting a heart attack, chances of getting a diabetic shock
and possibility of a tumor) [6], [7]. Therefore, AI-enabled
big data analytics phase is also included in ASCP-IoMT.
Hence the proposed ASCP-IoMT seems very useful from
the healthcare point of view, i.e., for the better treatment,
control and prediction of health problems of the patients
[4], [17], [18].
B. ATTACK MODEL

We use the guidelines of the widely used Dolev-Yao (DY)
threat model [19]. As per the DY model, the communicating
VOLUME 10, 2022
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entities (i.e., IMDs, servers, users) communicate over the
public channel (i.e., Internet). It means that an active or a
passive adversary A of the network/system may intercept,
disclose, update, delete, or delay the exchanged messages.
Moreover, A can also capture some of the deployed IMDs
physically and use them to extract sensitive information
(i.e., secret keys) from their memory under the execution of
steps of advanced power analysis attacks [20]. The guidelines
of another important model, ‘‘Canetti and Krawczyk’s adversary model is also known as CK-adversary model, which
is the current de facto standard model in the modeling of
an authenticated key agreement security protocol, has been
also followed in the designing of ASCP-IoMT. As per the
‘‘CK-adversary model, A can have all the capabilities like
the DY model, along with that he/she can compromise the
secret credentials and with the session keys or the session
states in the sessions.’’ Furthermore, trusted authority (TA)
is considered as the trusted entity of the network and this
will not be compromised in any case; Otherwise, the security
of the entire network will be compromised. The personal
servers are considered as semi-trusted entities of the network,
they are kept inside some physical locking system to prevent
against the physical device capture attack. The cloud servers
used for the AI-enabled big data analytics are considered as
the semi-trusted entities.
TABLE 1. Notations used in the paper.

Notation

Meaning

A
TA

An adversary
Trusted authority performs
registration of devices and servers
i th implantable medical device (IMD)
l h personal server
k th cloud server
Different timestamp values
Different random nonce values
Operation through hash function
Session key of party X and party Y
Operation through concatenation
Operation through bitwise exclusive-OR (XOR)

IMDi
PSj

csk
TS1
rn1

h(•)

1PX,Y

II

EB

IV. PROPOSED PROTOCOL: ASCP-IoMT

In this section, we discuss various phases of ASCP-IoMT.
ASCP-IoMT consists of the following important phases:
a) registration phase, b) authentication and key management
phase, c) dynamic device addition phase d) key revocation
phase and e) AI-based Big data analytics phase.
We assume that the various entities involved in the network
are synchronized with their clocks in order to prevent relay
attack protection against an adversary. This assumption is
realistic as it is used in designing the security protocols for
IoT-enabled networking environments [21]–[25]. The details
of various notations are given in Table 1.

IEEEAccess·

1) REGISTRATION OF IMDs

The registration of an IMDi is performed as follows:
• RGIMD1: IDIMDi is chosen as a ‘‘unique identity
for the implantable medical device IMDi ’’ by TA.
Further, TA computes its pseudo identity RIDIMDi =
h(IDIMDi || µTA || µIMDi ), where µTA is the secret key of
TA and µIMDi is the secret key of IMDi .
• RGIMD2: Further TA calculates temporal credentials
of IMDi as TCIMDi = h(IDIMDi || φIMDi || µIMDi ), where
φIMDi is the registration timestamp value of device IMDi .
TA again generates the temporary identity as TIDIMDi
and deployment area identity as fIMDi for IMDi .
• RGIMD3: After completing these steps, TA stores
{RIDIMDi , TCIMDi , TIDIMDi , fIMDi , h(·)} in the memory
of IMDi before its deployment.
2) REGISTRATION OF PERSONAL SERVERS

The TA performs the registration of the personal server PSj as
follows:
• RGPS1: IDPSj is chosen as a ‘‘unique identity for
the personal server PSj ’’ by TA. Further TA calculates
RIDPSj = h(IDPSj ||µTA ||µPSj ) as the pseudo-identity for
the same PSj , where µPSj is the secret key of PSj . TA also
generates a shared secret key of PSj and CSk as µPSj ,CSk ,
which is used for their secure communication. It is also
note that the value of µPSj ,CSk is different for different
PSj and CSk .
• RGPS2: After the generations of these values, the
TA stores {(TIDIMDi , RIDIMDi , TCIMDi , fIMDi )|i =
1, 2, · · · , numIMDi }, RIDPSj , µPSj ,CSk , h(·)} in the memory of PSj before its deployment.
3) REGISTRATION OF CLOUD SERVERS

The registration of cloud server CSk is performed as follows:
• RGCS1: IDCSk is chosen as a unique identity for
the cloud server CSk by TA. Again TA calculates
RIDCSk = h(IDCSk || µTA || µCSk ) as the pseudo-identity
for the same CSk , where µCSk is the secret key of CSk .
• RGCS2: After these generation of these values, TA
stores {(RIDPSj |j = 1, 2, · · · , numPSj )}, RIDCSk ,
{µPSj ,CSk |j = 1, 2, · · · , numPSj }, h(·)} in the memory
of CSk , where numPSj are the total number of personal servers. Here, it is important to mention that
{µPSj ,CSk |j = 1, 2, · · · , numPSj } mean that we have
different shared secret keys for different personal servers
and cloud server CSk .
B. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY MANAGEMENT (AKM)
PHASE

This procedure is required for the secure messages exchange
between the legitimate IMDi and PSj , and also between legitimate PSj and CSk .

A. REGISTRATION PHASE

In this phase, a trusted authority (TA) does the registration of
different communicating parties, like IMDs, personal servers
and cloud servers.
VOLUME 10, 2022

1) AKM BETWEEN IMDi AND PSj

The authentication and key establishment between IMDi and
PSj is performed as follows:
57993
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IMDi
Generate rn1 & TS1.
Compute M1 = rn1 EB h(RIDIMD.11 TS1),
M2 = h(rn1II RIDIMDJI TCIMD.11 TS1II hMDJ(MSG1 = {TlDJMDo M1, M2, TS1}~
(via open channel)

Check if IT S2 - Ts~ I S !1T? If so,
compute h(rn2II RlDps;) = M3 EB h(RIDIMD,11 TS1II TS2),
'l/JJMD,,PS; = h(h(rn2II RIDPs;)II
RIDJMD,11 TCJMD,II rn1II TS1II TS2)
Ml= h('l/JIMD,,Ps;II TS1II TS2)Check if Ml = M4? If so, compute TI D"J'J)Jh, = M5
EBh(RIDJMD,11 TCJMD,II h(rn2II RlDps;)).
Replace TIDf'flD, with TIDJMD,·

Check if ITS1 -TSil S !1T?
If so, fetch RIDJMD,, TCJMD,, hMD,·
Compute rn1 = M1 EB h(RIDJMD,11 TS1),
M~ = h(rn1II RIDJMD,11 TCJMD,II TS1II hMDJCheck if M~ = M 2 ? If so, generate rn 2 & TS2 • Compute
M3 = h(rn2II RIDPs;)EB h(RIDJMD,11 TS1II TS2),
'l/JPS;,IMD, = h(h(rn2IIRlDps;)II RIDIMD,
IITCJMD.1I rn1II TS1II TS2),
M4 = h('l/JPS;,IMD,11 TS1II TS2)Generate TI Df'flD .
Compute M5 = TIDf'flD, EB h(RIDIMD.11
TCJMD,II h(rn2II RlDps;)).
~MSG2 = {M3, M4, M5, TS2})
(via open channel)

Generate TS3
Compute M5 = h('l/JIMD,,Ps;II
TIDf'JlD,11 TS3).
(MSG3 = {M5, TS3}~
(via open channel)

Check if ITS3 -TS3I S !1T? If so,
compute Ml= h('l/JPs;,IMD,11 TIDf'flD.11 TS3).
Check if Ml = M5? If so,

update TIDIMD, with TIDf'flD.
Both IM Di and PSj store 'l/JJMD,,Ps = ('l/Jps ,IMDJ-

FIGURE 2. Summary of AKE between IMDi and PSj .

•

•

AKEIP1: IMDi starts the process and generates a random nonce rn1 and the current timestamp TS1 and then
generates following values M1 = rn1 ⊕ h(RIDIMDi ||
TS1 ), M2 = h(rn1 || RIDIMDi || TCIMDi || TS1 || fIMDi ).
Later on IMDi sends hMSG1 = {TIDIMDi , M1 , M2 , TS1 }i
to PSj via public channel. After receiving MSG1 from
IMDi , PSj verifies the timestamp value TS1 through
condition |TS1 − TS1∗ | ≤ 1T , where TS1∗ represents the receiving timestamp value of MSG1 . If this
verification happens successfully, then PSj fetches
RIDIMDi , TCIMDi , fIMDi from its memory corresponding
to received TIDIMDi value. PSj then calculates values
like rn1 = M1 ⊕ h(RIDIMDi || TS1 ) and M20 = h(rn1 ||
RIDIMDi || TCIMDi || TS1 || fIMDi ). PSj again verifies M20 =
M2 ? If these values matches then IMDi is authenticated
with PSj . In different circumstances, IMDi ’s authentication is failed.
AKEIP2: Further PSj generates a random nonce
rn2 along with a current timestamp TS2 and calculates values like, M3 = h(rn2 || RIDPSj ) ⊕ h(RIDIMDi ||
TS1 || TS2 ), session key ψPSj ,IMDi = h(h(rn2 ||RIDPSj )||
RIDIMDi || TCIMDi || rn1 || TS1 || TS2 ) and M4 =
h(ψPSj ,IMDi || TS1 || TS2 ). After the computing these
parameters, PSj generates new temporary identity for
new
IMDi as TIDnew
IMDi and estimates M5 = TIDIMDi ⊕
h(RIDIMDi || TCIMDi || h(rn2 || RIDPSj )). Then PSj sends

57994

•

hMSG2 = {M3 , M4 , M5 , TS2 }i to IMDi via public
channel.
AKEIP3: Upon the arrival of MSG2 , IMDi first verifies
the timeliness of TS2 through condition |TS2 − TS2∗ | ≤
1T , where TS2∗ is the receiving timestamp value of
MSG2 . If it verifies successfully then IMDi calculates
h(rn2 || RIDPSj ) = M3 ⊕ h(RIDIMDi || TS1 || TS2 ), session
key ψIMDi ,PSj = h(h(rn2 || RIDPSj )|| RIDIMDi || TCIMDi ||
rn1 || TS1 || TS2 ) and M40 = h(ψIMDi ,PSj || TS1 || TS2 ).
IMDi goes for the verification of M40 = M4 ? If that happens successfully then PSj is authenticated with IMDi .
In other circumstances the authentication of PSi is failed
with IMDi . Further IMDi calculates its new temporary
identity through TIDnew
IMDi = M5 ⊕ h(RIDIMDi || TCIMDi ||
h(rn2 || RIDPS j )) and replaces TIDnew
IMDi with TIDIMDi .
IMDi again generates another fresh timestamp TS3 and
calculates M6 = h(ψIMDi ,PSj || TIDnew
IMDi || TS3 ). Then
IMDi sends hMSG3 = {M6 , TS3 }i to PSj via public
channel. Upon the arrival of MSG3 , PSj verifies the
timeliness of TS3 as per the condition explained earlier.
If that happens successfully then PSj computes M60 =
h(ψPSj ,IMDi || TIDnew
IMDi || TS3 ). Again PSj goes for the
verification of M60 = M6 ? If it matches, then the session
key calculated by IMDi is correct and IMDi has successfully updated the TIDnew
IMDi . PSj also updates TIDIMDi
with TIDnew
IMDi in its database. Finally, both IMDi and PSj
VOLUME 10, 2022
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establish session key ψIMDi ,PSj = (ψPSj ,IMDi ) for their
secure communication.
After the completion of the above discussed steps, both
IMDi and PSj establish a session key for their secure communication. The summary of authentication and key establishment between IMDi and PSj is also given in Figure 2.
2) KEY MANAGEMENT BETWEEN PSj AND CSk

For the secure exchange of messages, both PSj and CSk can
use the stored µPSj ,CSk shared secret key. PSj can encrypt
the message µPSj ,CSk , which will be further decrypted by
the recipient, i.e., CSk through the same key µPSj ,CSk . It is
also important to mention that freshly generated timestamp
values can also be included in the exchanged messages for
the prevention of replay attack.
C. DYNAMIC DEVICE ADDITION PHASE

IoMT may suffer from the failures of a certain number of
IMDs. Therefore, it is always required to add a new device
(i.e., IMDnew
i ) in the network. TA does the tasks of addition
of a new IMDnew
as follows:
i
• DAIMD1: IDIMDnew is chosen as a unique identity for
i
IMDnew
by TA. Further, TA calculates RIDIMDnew
=
i
i
new
h(IDIMDnew
||
µ
||
µ
)
as
the
pseudo
identity
for
TA
IMDi
i
new
IMDnew
i , where µTA is the secret key of TA and µIMDi
is the secret key of IMDnew
.
i
• DAIMD2: Further TA calculates temporal credentials of
IMDnew
as TCIMDnew
= h(IDIMDnew
|| φIMDnew
|| µIMDnew
),
i
i
i
i
i
new . TA
where φIMDnew
is
the
registration
timestamp
IMD
i
i
again generates the temporary identity as TIDIMDνi and
deployment area identity as fIMDνi for IMDi . Furthermore, fIMDνi may be equal to fIMDi .
• DAIMD3: After computing these values, TA stores
{RIDIMDnew
, TCIMDnew
, TIDIMDνi , fIMDνi , h(·)} in the memi
i
before
its deployment. TA also informs
ory of IMDnew
i
the other devices, like personal servers about the addition of new IMD in a secure way. In the similar way the
addition of new PSj can be done, if it is desired.
Remark 1: Here, it is also important to mention that PSj ,
and CSk store all secret information, for example, secret keys
and identities in the secured region of their database. Thus
these values are not available to A to launch further attacks,
i.e., ‘‘stolen verifier attack, MiTM, impersonation attack and
illegal session key computation attack’’ on ASCP-IoMT. Such
kind of strong assumptions are also considered in RSA/ECCbased secure communication systems, which are deployed in
recent times.
D. KEY REVOCATION PHASE

Using this phase, the trusted authority TA can update the
shared secret key of personal server PSj and cloud server
CSk as it is required in case of any key leakage or if key
is in use from the long time. For that purpose TA generates
new shared secret key µνPSj ,CSk and then replace it with the
old key µPSj ,CSk in the database of PSj and CSk securely
in the online mode. Here it is important to mention that
VOLUME 10, 2022
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TA communicates securely with PSj and CSk through the
secret keys i.e., MKTA,PSj and MKTA,CSk . Therefore, all information exchange happens through MKTA,PSj and MKTA,CSk
in between TA and PSj , and TA and CSk , respectively.
Finally, PSj have information {(TIDIMDi , RIDIMDi , TCIMDi ,
fIMDi )|i = 1, 2, · · · , numIMDi }, RIDPSj , µνPSj ,CSk , h(·)} in its
database. Moreover, CSk have information {( RIDPSj |j =
1, 2, · · · , numPSj }, RIDCSk , (µνPSj ,CSk |j = 1, 2, · · · , numPSj ),
h(·)} in its database.
E. AI-ENABLED BIG DATA ANALYTICS PHASE

Big data is the heterogeneous collection of data that generates
a huge amount of volume. In AI-enabled big data analytics, AI methods execute on this diverse data through some
machine learning (ML) algorithms. This process examines a
large amount of data (i.e., healthcare data) to uncover hidden
patterns and other useful information from it [8]. This is
further helpful for the prediction of some phenomena. The
huge amounts of diverse data make it possible for the ML
algorithms to learn and predict with negligible errors. Thus
the overall performance (i.e., accuracy) of the system can
be improved if a huge amount of data is made available to
the AI module. Because in that situation, it can learn in a
better way that also improves its pattern recognition capabilities. AI-enabled big data analytics phase is required for the
forecast of useful outcomes (i.e., the possibility of a tumor)
[26], [27]. This task is supposed to happen at the authorized
cloud server, i.e., CSk . CSk calls the steps of big data analytics. CSk first executes the necessary steps of data aggregation. This accumulated information is useful for the big
data analysis process. The deployed AI module will learn
and predict on the basis of available training and testing data.
Furthermore, CSk executes other essentials steps like ‘‘data
analysis,’’ ‘‘data visualization & prediction on the accumulated data’’. The final results of this phase come out in the
form of some significant results (predictions) as explained
earlier [4].
The process flow diagram of the proposed ASCP-IoMT is
depicted in Figure 3. This provides an overview of various
processes (for example, registration of devices and server,
authentication and key establishment between IMD and personal server, key management between personal server and
cloud server, AI-enabled big data analytics and key revocation), which are associated with the proposed ASCP-IoMT.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS

In this section, we first provide the correctness of the proposed scheme. Next, we provide both informal (heuristics)
and formal security analysis for the proposed scheme (ASCPIoMT) to show its robustness against various attacks.
A. CORRECTNESS PROOF

In Theorem 1, we provide the correctness of the proposed
ASCP-IoMT by showing that two entities always establish
the same common key between them.
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FIGURE 3. Process flow diagram of ASCP-IoMT.

Theorem 1: In the proposed ASCP-IoMT, during the
authentication and key management phase the session keys
established between IMDi and PSj are the same.
Proof: At the time of authentication and key establishment between IMDi and PSj , PSj calculates the session
key shared with IMDi as ψPSj ,IMDi = h(h(rn2 ||RIDPSj )||
RIDIMDi || TCIMDi || rn1 || TS1 || TS2 ). After mutual authentication, IMDi calculates the session key shared with PSj
as ψIMDi ,PSj = h(h(rn2 || RIDPSj )|| RIDIMDi || TCIMDi || rn1 ||
TS1 || TS2 ). It is worth noticing that PSj derives rn1 = M1 ⊕
h(RIDIMDi || TS1 ) from the message hMSG1 = {TIDIMDi , M1 ,
M2 , TS1 }i, whereas IMDi derives h(rn2 || RIDPSj ) = M3 ⊕
h(RIDIMDi || TS1 || TS2 ) from the message hMSG2 = {M3 , M4 ,
M5 , TS2 }i. It is then follows that ψPSj ,IMDi = ψIMDi ,PSj . 
B. INFORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS

ASCP-IoMT is able to defend the following types of attacks.

attack on ASCP-IoMT. Therefore, ASCP-IoMT provides protection for a replay attack.
2) MAN-IN-THE-MIDDLE (MiTM) AND IMPERSONATION
ATTACKS

In ASCP-IoMT messages, like MSG1 , MSG2 , and MSG3 were
exchanged. These messages are incorporated with different randomly generated nonce values, i.e., rn1 , and rn2 .
Apart from that, each message contains various secret
key and identity values (i.e., IDIMDi , IDPSj , IDCSk , φIMDi ,
µIMDi , µPSj , µCSk , µTA , µPSj ,CSk ). These secret values are
not known to A. Therefore, A can not update the exchanged
messages. Moreover, in such a situation A is also not able to
generate the same message on behalf of a legitimate entity of
the network. Due to the aforementioned procedure, A is not
able to launch in MiTM and impersonation attacks on ASCPIoMT. Thus, ASCP-IoMT provides protection for MiTM and
impersonation attacks.

1) REPLAY ATTACK

3) EPHEMERAL SECRET LEAKAGE (ESL) ATTACK

In ASCP-IoMT messages, like MSG1 , MSG2 , and MSG3 were
exchanged. These messages are Incorporated with different
freshly generated timestamp values, i.e., TS1 , TS2 , and TS3 .
These timestamp values are also verified at the receiver’s end,
when a message arrives. Due to this procedure of timestamp
generation and verification, A is not able to launch the replay

It is preferable to check the possibility of ‘‘Ephemeral Secret
Leakage (ESL) attack’’ on a newly designed authentication
and key establishment scheme. It proves the resilience of that
scheme whether A has ability to compute the session key
or not. We contemplate ‘‘short term secrets (for example,
random secrets) and long term secrets (for example, secret
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keys and various real identities)’’ in the proposed ASCPIoMT. In each session, parties compute a new session key
and then establish that key for their secure communication.
However, A is not aware of these secret values. Thus, he/she
can not compute the correct session key on behalf of a legitimate entity of the network. Hence, ASCP-IoMT provides
protection against ‘‘unauthorized session key computation
attack under CK-adversary model’’. In this way, ESL attack
is protected in the proposed ASCP-IoMT.
4) PRIVILEGED INSIDER ATTACK

In ASCP-IoMT, it is considered that all registered secret
information should be deleted from the database of TA. Therefore, this secret information is not available to the insider
user of TA. Hence, required information is not available to
the malicious insider user for the launching of associated
attacks, like ‘‘MiTM, impersonation attack, secret credentials guessing, and illegal session key computation attacks.’’
Thereafter ASCP-IoMT provides protection for a privileged
insider attack.
5) PHYSICAL IMD CAPTURE ATTACK

In ASCP-IoMT, any secret information is not stored in the
plaintext in the memory of IMDs. Even if A physically
captures an IMD and tries to deduce some secret information (i.e., its stored session key) from its memory through
the application of an advanced power analysis attack [20].
However, such kind of malicious tasks will only reveal the
session key of this particular IMD not the session keys of
other IMDs. Because as per the arrangements of ASCP-IoMT
each device computes and establishes different session keys
for the different sessions. Thus such kind of compromising
does not affect the remaining part of the communication
and it is still safe and secure. Hence ASCP-IoMT provides
protection for physical IMD compromised attacks.
6) STOLEN VERIFIER ATTACK

Stolen verifier attack is another important attack that an
authentication and key establishment should defend it.
In the presence of this attack, A has an ability to perform other potential attacks. For example, A can launch
MiTM, impersonation, unauthorised credentials guessing,
illegal session key computation attacks on a newly designed
scheme. In proposed ASCP-IoMT, as per the aforementioned mechanism, all sensitive values are stored in the
secured region of the databases residing in the personal
server and cloud server. Moreover, a personal server is also
maintained inside a physical locking system in order to
protect against the physical stealing and other associated
attacks [28]. Therefore, the sensitive information is not available to the adversary A for launching potential attacks, like
‘‘MiTM, impersonation, unauthorised credentials guessing,
illegal session key computation’’ attacks. Hence, ASCPIoMT provides protection for stolen verifier attack (see also
Remark 1).
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7) ANONYMITY AND UNTRACEABILITY

In ASCP-IoMT, we do not exchange any identity in the plaintext. The identities of the devices and users are anonymous.
Further, all exchanged messages are calculated via ‘‘freshly
generated timestamp values and random nonce values’’.
Therefore, the aforementioned procedure produces distinct
messages in different sessions. Thus, A is not able to trace the
exchanged messages. After a while, ASCP-IoMT supports
the essential anonymity and untraceability properties.
C. FORMAL SECURITY ANALYSIS THROUGH
REAL-OR-RANDOM (ROR) MODEL

We formally analyze the proposed ASCP-IoMT to prove its
security against other potential attacks. We conduct formal
security analysis through ‘‘Real-Or-Random (ROR) random
oracle model’’. Here it is important to discuss that ROR
model [29] is the standard model, which is used to provide the
proof of security of session key (SK) in the proposed ASCPIoMT. This model is also used in some recently published
‘‘authentication schemes’’ to provide the proof of security of
session key.
There are two participants in proposed ASCP-IoMT,
i.e., IMDi and PSj , during the ‘‘authentication and key management (AKM) phase of ASCP-IoMT’’ (for the secure of
t
communication of IMDi and PSj ). We express OIMD
and
i
v
OPSj as the instances t and v of IMDi and PSj , respectively.
These considered instances are also taken as the oracles. The
ROR model has following essential terminologies.
t
v
• Participants. We express OIMD
and OPS
as the
i
j
instances t and v of IMDi and PSj , respectively. These
instances are also considered as the oracles.
• Accepted state. At the receiving of the last protocol
message, an instance Ot is in the accept state then we
understand that Ot goes to the accepted state. If all
communicated messages, for example, send and receive
messages by Ot ) are concatenated according to the
order. (sid) of Ot is taken as session identification for
a particular session.
• Partnering. Instance O l1 and O l2 are considered as
the partner of each other. In case if following three
conditions provides assurance: 1) ‘‘both instances are
in the accepted states’’, 2) ‘‘both instances mutually authenticate each other and share the same session id sid’’, and 3) ‘‘both instances are mutual
partners’’.
• Freshness. Suppose that session key SKij does not disclose under the deployment of reveal query R. Under
t
v
these circumstances, it can be said that OIMD
or OPS
i
j
are fresh and latest.
• Adversary. The adversary A is executed through DolevYao (DY) model. Under such circumstances, it is considered as A has control over the communication, which is
happening through the public channel. Therefore, A can
perform some unauthorised activities i.e., eavesdrop,
delete, update, or injection of false messages with the
help of following queries.
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– E (Ot , Ov ): The eavesdropping attack, which is
passive in nature, can be executed with this execute
query. With query A can eavesdrop the exchanged
messages of entities IMDi and PSj .
– S (Ot , msg): It is executed like the active attack.
A sends or receives messages to or from Ot via send
query.
– R (Ot ): It is one of the important query. reveal
query tries to reveal session key SKij reckoned by
Ot and the other associated entity to the attacker A
for a particular session.
– T (Ot ): Before starting the game, an unbiased coin
c is flipped, which is executed via test query. Then
there is the flipping of coin, which may produce
different outcomes (results). On the basis of the
results of coin flipping, following decisions are
made. If the result of coin flipping is, c = 1 then
Ot returns session key SKij . Otherwise, in case of
c = 0, then it returns a null value (⊥). Here it is
important to mention that A can perform the execution of an unlimited number of T (Ot ) queries.
• Semantic security: Semantic security of session key
SKij is another important parameter. The semantic security of session key ψPSj ,IMDi (= ψIMDi ,PSj ), which is
established in between IMDi and PSj is analysed through
ROR model. It depends on the adversary A’s capabilities
to discover the difference between the real session key
and a random number. The result of T (Ot ) query should
be compatible with random bit c. Let say A guesses
c0 bit. If Succ is the expression of winning probability,
the advantage of A in breaking the semantic security
of ψPSj ,IMDi (= ψIMDi ,PSj ) of ASCP-IoMT is given by
AdvASCP−IoMT
= |2.Pr[Succ]−1|, where the probability
A
of an event X is Pr[X ].
• Random oracle: In proposed ASCP-IoMT cryptographic one-way hash function h(·) is utilized. It is executed like a random oracle, i.e., Hash value of h(·) is
public. In which all participants including A, are able to
access the Hash oracle.
Theorem 2: Suppose a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
adversary A exists which runs in polynomial time tp and
attempts to obtain the session key ψPSj ,IMDi (= ψIMDi ,PSj )
between an IMD device IMDi and its associated personal
server PSj during the AKE phase of the proposed scheme
(ASCP-IoMT). Let qh and |Hash| represent the number of
Hash queries and the range space of a one-way collisionresistant hash function h(·), respectively. Then, the advantage
of A denoted by AdvASCP−IoMT
, in breaking the semantic
A
security of the ASCP-IoMT for deriving the session key
q2h
.
ψPSj ,IMDi (= ψIMDi ,PSj ) is AdvASCP−IoMT
≤ |Hash|
A
Proof: In this proof, the four games Gmj , j ∈ [0, 3] are
considered. The event is formulated in which A can guess the
random bit c in the Gmj correctly and its success probability
Gm
can be written as SuccA j . The advantage of A to win a game
Gm
Gmj is written as AdvASCP−IoMT
= Pr[SuccA j ].
A,Gmj
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Game Gm0 : This game is executed initially. It is the identical game with an actual scheme running under the fundamentals of ROR model. Under such assumptions following
equation can be achieved:
AdvASCP−IoMT
= |2.AdvASCP−IoMT
− 1|.
A
A,Gm0

(1)

Game Gm1 : Game Gm1 simulates the eavesdropping
attack. In Gm1 query, E is executed. Further, A performs
the execution of query T at the end of this game. A’s
task is to the inequality of session key SKij and a random
number when the output of query T is received. In proposed ASCP-IoMT, session key established by IMDi and
PSj is ψPSj ,IMDi = h(h(rn2 ||RIDPSj )|| RIDIMDi || TCIMDi ||
rn1 || TS1 || TS2 ). In the calculation of session key both ‘‘long
term secrets, i.e., secret keys and identities, as well as the
short term secrets, i.e., freshly generated timestamp values
and random secret values’’ are utilized. Hence through the
eavesdropping of messages MSG1 , MSG2 and MSG3 , winning probability of the game Gm1 does not change and is
not again helping in the computation of session key SKij .
According to the ‘‘indistinguishability of Gm0 and Gm1 ’’ we
can achieve:
AdvASCP−IoMT
= AdvASCP−IoMT
A,Gm1
A,Gm0

(2)

Game Gm2 : This game simulates another active attack
(other active attacks). Here A does the simulation of S and
Hash queries to misguide the communicating entity to obtain
the fake messages. A does exercises with some Hash queries
to find out the collision in hash outcomes for MSG1 , MSG2 ,
and MSG3 messages. For the estimation of these messages,
we use both long term secrets, i.e., secret keys and identities
as well as short term secrets, i.e., freshly generated timestamp
values and random secret values, which produce distinct messages for distinct sessions. However, if A launches several S
queries, then again he/ she does not have the capability to find
out any collision in the outputs of hash. Therefore, with the
birthday paradox following result is achieved:
q2h
.
(3)
2|Hash|
After execution of these queries, A needs to guess the
correct bit c. It then follows that
1
AdvASCP−IoMT
= .
(4)
A,Gm2
2
Using Eqs. (1) and (2), subsequent result is produced:
1
1
− |
.AdvASCP−IoMT
= |AdvASCP−IoMT
A
A
,Gm
0
2
2
1
ASCP−IoMT
− |
= |AdvA,Gm1
2
= |AdvASCP−IoMT
A,Gm1
|AdvASCP−IoMT
− AdvASCP−IoMT
|≤
A,Gm1
A,Gm2

− AdvASCP−IoMT
|
A,Gm2

(5)

The ‘‘triangular inequality’’ and Eqs. (3) and (5) provide
subsequent result:
1
.AdvASCP−IoMT
= |AdvASCP−IoMT
A
A,Gm1
2
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− AdvASCP−IoMT
|
A,Gm2
≤

≤

|AdvASCP−IoMT
A,Gm1
− AdvASCP−IoMT
|
A,Gm2
q2h
2|Hash|

(6)

Finally, if we multiply both sides of Eq. (6) with a factor of 2,
q2h
then the desired result is achieved: AdvASCP−IoMT
≤ |Hash|
.
A

VI. COMPARATIVE STUDY

The comparative study of ASCP-IoMT and other related
existing schemes like Merabet et al. [15], Jang et al. [13]
and He-Zeadally [14] is conducted for the comparisons of
computation costs, communication costs and security and
functionality features. The rough estimated time for different cryptographic can be obtained as per the scenarios
given in [30]. The approximate computation time (seconds)
for various operations, i.e., ‘‘One-way hash function Th ’’,
‘‘ECC point multiplication Tecm ’’, ‘‘ECC point addition
Teca ’’, ‘‘Symmetric key encryption Tsenc ’’, ‘‘Symmetric key
decryption Tsdec ’’, ‘‘Modular exponentiation Tme ’’, ‘‘Fuzzy
extractor function Tfe ’’ are 0.00032, 0.0171, 0.0044, 0.0056,
0.0056, 0.0192 and 0.0171 [30].
TABLE 2. Comparison of various computation costs.

Scheme
Jang et al. [13]
He-Zeadally [14]
Merabet et al. [15]
(Protocol-I)
Merabet et al. [ 15]
(Protocol-II )
ASCP-IoMT

Computation cost (in milliseconds)
25Tecm + 15Teca + 5Th ~ 495.10 ms
4Th +8Tsenc +6Tecm ~ 148.68 ms
6Tecm + 6Th + Teca ~ 108.92 ms
4Tecm
l5Th

+ 4Th

~

~

69.68 ms

4.80 ms

TABLE 3. Comparison of various communication costs.

Scheme
Jang et al. [13]
He-Zeadally [14]
Merabet et al. [15]
(Protocol-I )
Merabet et al. [15]
( Protocol-II )
ASCP-IoMT

No. of messages

No. of bits

8

4
3

5920
2944
1472

3

1472

3

1792

TABLE 4. Security and functionality attributes comparison.

Feature

Merabet
et al. [15]

Jang
etal. [13]

HeZeadally [14]

Proposed
ASCP-IoMT

,pfi
,f;h
,f;h
,pf4
,pf5
,pf5
,f;h
,f;fs
,pfg
,f;f10
,pf11

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

X

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

X

X

X

✓

✓

✓

,f;fi2

X

X

X

,pfi3

X

X

X

,pfi4

✓

X

X

✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

X

✓
✓
X

✓

Note: ,jJ Ji: "mutual authentication/access control"; ,jJ h: "anonymity";

Table 2 has the comparison of computational costs of
proposed ASCP-IoMT and other similar techniques. The
computation cost for the scheme of Jang et al. [13] is calculated as 25Tecm + 15Teca + 5Th ≈ 495.10 ms. In case of
scheme of Merabet et al. [15] (in Protocol-I), it is calculated
as 6Tecm + 6Th + Teca ≈ 108.92 ms and for their second
protocol, i.e., Protocol-II it is calculated as 4Tecm + 4Th ≈
69.68 ms. Again for the scheme of He-Zeadally [14] as
4Th +8Tsenc +6Tecm ≈ 148.68 ms. However, for ASCPIoMT, it is calculated as 15Th ≈ 4.80 ms. During the analysis,
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we have identified that ASCP-IoMT requires low computational cost as compared to the other similar techniques,
i.e., Jang et al.’ scheme [13], Merabet et al.’ scheme [15] and
He-Zeadally’s scheme [14].
Further, Table 3 has the comparison of communication
costs of ASCP-IoMT and other similar techniques. It is under
the assumption that size of identity, a timestamp, a random
number (nonce) and a hash output (if SHA-256 hashing algorithm is applied) are 160 bits, 32 bits, 160 bits and 256 bits,
respectively. Entities in ASCP-IoMT communicates via three
different messages, which are of sizes 704 bits, 800 bits
and 288 bits. Therefore, the final communication cost of
ASCP-IoMT is computed as 704 +800 +288 = 1792 bits.
During the analysis, we have identified that proposed
ASCP-IoMT requires less communication cost as compared
to Jang et al.’ scheme [13] and He-Zeadally’ scheme [14].
Though the communication cost of ASCP-IoMT is little
higher than Merabet et al.’ scheme but it can be accepted as
ASCP-IoMT provides higher security and more functionality
features.
In Table 4, a comparison of security and functionality
features among ASCP-IoMT and other techniques against
the best recognized security and functionality features is
provided. From the conducted analysis, it has been observed
that ASCP-IoMT provides better security with additional
functionality features as compared to the techniques of
Jang et al. [13], Merabet et al. [15] and He-Zeadally [14].

,pfa: "untraceability"; ,pf4: "session-key agreement"; ,f;fs: "session key
security under CK adversary model"; ,pf5: "confidentiality"; ,f;h: "integrity"; ,f;fs: "strong replay attack"; ,pfg: "man-in-the-middle attack";
,f;fto: "dynamic IM D addition"; ,f;fi1: "protection against impersonation
attack"; ,jJ !12: "AI-enabled big data analytics phase"; ,jJ ha: "key revocation phase"; ,pf14: "practical impelmentaion".
x : "a scheme is insecure against a particular attack or it does not support
a particular feature"; ✓: "a scheme is secure against a particular attack or
supports a particular feature"; N/A: "not applicable in a scheme".

VII. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION

In this section, we provide the details of the practical implementation of the proposed ASCP-IoMT. It is conducted
in two ways, firstly, we implement proposed ASCP-IoMT
using the widely used widely-used NS2 2.35 simulation
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software tool [31] for measuring the impact of authentication and key establishment procedure on the performance
of important performance parameters, i.e., end-to-end delay,
throughput and packet loss rate. After that, we simulate
‘‘AI-based big data analytics phase’’ of proposed ASCPIoMT. As it is important to find out the performance of various machine learning techniques for the considered scenarios
in ASCP-IoMT.

•
•

The message < MSG2 = M3 , M4 , M5 , TS2 > from PSj
to IMDi requires = 800 bits.
The message < MSG3 = M6 , TS3 > from IMDi to PSj
requires = 288 bits.

B. DISCUSSION ON NS2 SIMULATION OUTCOMES

In the experimentation, network performance parameters
like, end-to-end delay (in seconds), throughput (in bits per
second) and packet loss rate are computed.

A. DETAILS OF NS2 SIMULATION STUDY

NS2-based simulations are desirable for measuring the
impact of newly designed scheme on the performance network parameters. This tool is among the popular simulation
tools, which are used to measure the network performance
parameters in different types of networks. The simulations of
various protocols, i.e., Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/
User Datagram Protocol (UDP), wireless body area network
(WBAN), routing protocols and multicast protocols can be
performed through NS2. In Table 5, we provide the details
of various parameters, which are used during the NS2 simulation. Ubuntu 18.04 LTS platform was used to perform
the simulation through the NS2 2.35 simulation tool. The
wireless protocol IEEE 802.15.4 was chosen to perform the
simulation. Three different cases are taken in the simulation.
We consider one, two and three personal servers for Case-1,
Case-2, and Case-3, respectively. The number of IMDs is
considered as 5 (in Case 1) 10 (in Case 2) and 15 (in Case 3).
We have taken 1800 seconds as the simulation time. The communication ranges of IMD and personal server are considered
as 25 and 100 meters, respectively. ‘‘Ad-hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV)’’ [32] designed by Perkins and
Royer is taken as the routing protocol. The other associated
parameters are taken with the standard values.

1) IMPACT ON END-TO-END DELAY

End-to-End Delay (EED) is the average time needed by the
messages to reach the destination from the source point.
In an authentication and key establishment procedure, it is
essentially required to compute the value of EED, as it
gives the rough estimate of time required to complete the
authentication and key establishment procedure for various
communicating entities, i.e., IMSi and PSj . In case of an
efficient authentication and key establishment scheme the
value of EED should be as less as possible. The EED values
for the proposed ASCP-IoMT for different considered cases
(for example, Case-1, Case-2, Case-3) are given in Figure 4.
The EED values are 0.01587, 0.07440 and 0.17097 seconds
for Case-1, Case-2 and Case-3, respectively. Here it is important to discuss that the value of EED increases with the
increasing number of IMD and PS devices as it causes the
increment in the number of exchanged messages. Therefore,
EED increases accordingly from Case-1 to Case-2 and Case-2
to Case-3.
Case-I Case-2 Case-3 -

TABLE 5. NS2 simulation parameters and their values.

Parameter
Platform
Simulation tool
Wireless protocol
Number of personal servers

Number of IMDs

Simulation time
Communication range of IMDs
Communication range of
personal server
Routing protocol

Description
Ubuntu 18.04 LTS
NS2 2.35
802.15.4
01 (Case-I),
02 (Case-2),
03 (Case-3)
05 (Case-I),
10 (Case-2),
15 (Case-2)
1800 seconds
25 meters
100 meters
AODV [32]

The communication costs (bits) of messages exchanged
among various entities are calculated with the following
details. In the ‘‘authentication and key establishement’’ procedure of IMDi and PSj , we have the following messages
exchanged:
• The message < MSG1 = TIDIMDi , M1 , M2 , TS1 > from
IMDi to PSj requires = 704 bits.
58000

Scenarios
FIGURE 4. End-to-end delay (in seconds) in various scenarios.

2) IMPACT ON THROUGHPUT

Throughput is also an important network performance parameter. It is the estimation of number of bits transmitted per unit
of time. The Throughput values of ASCP-IoMT for various
considered cases are given in Figure 5. The throughput values
of ASCP-IoMT are 5.05, 10.88 and 16.41 bps for Case-1,
Case-2 and Case-3, receptively. Here it is important to discuss
that the value of the throughput increases with the increasing
number of IMD and PS devices as it causes the increment
in the number of exchanged messages. Therefore, network
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throughput increases accordingly from Case-1 to Case-2 and
Case-2 to Case-3.
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FIGURE 5. Throughput (in bps) in various scenarios.

3) IMPACT ON PACKET LOSS RATE

For a reliable communication scheme, it is desirable to estimate the value of the packet loss rate. The packet loss rate
is the estimation of number of packets loss per unit time.
It is the total number of lost packets for a given duration
of time. An authentication and key establishment scheme is
treated as reliable if it has less packet loss rate. The packet loss
rates of ASCP-IoMT for various considered cases are given
in Figure 6. The values of packet loss rate of ASCP-IoMT
are 0.00166, 0.00222 and 0.00333 for Case-1, Case-2 and
Case-3, respectively. Here it is important to discuss that the
value of ‘‘Packet loss rate’’ increases with the increasing
number of IMD and PS devices as it causes the increment in
the number of exchanged messages. That again causes traffic
congestion, and therefore, packet loss rate also increases
from Case-1 to Case-2 and Case-2 to Case-3. However, the
increased value of packet loss rate is marginal as ASCP-IoMT
is designed with lightweight cryptographic techniques.
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FIGURE 6. Packet loss rate in various scenarios.

C. SIMULATION STUDY ON AI-BASED BIG DATA
ANALYTICS

We have simulated the AI-based big data analytics phase of
ASCP-IoMT. As it is essential to find out the performance
of various machine learning techniques for the considered
scenarios in ASCP-IoMT. The dataset of ‘‘Heart Disease
Dataset’’, which is available on the IEEE Dataport [33] are
utilized for this work. This database is taken because it can
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be used for machine learning and data mining techniques for
diagnosis of coronary artery disease. In this dataset, there are
five heart datasets that are combined over eleven common
features. The required steps of AI-based big data analytics
can be executed at the authorized cloud server (say CSk ).
The following simulation environment and settings were
considered. The simulation environment of ‘‘AI-based big
data analytics phase’’ is set up as follows.
• Platform set up: i5 with 11th generation processor is
considered for the implementation. 8 GB RAM size with
2 GB Nvidia MX 450 Graphic Card is taken.
• Deployed tools and libraries: Google colab platform (environment) is considered. The different
libraries, like, ‘‘pandas is used to import and read data
in tabular form’’, ‘‘seaborne and matplotlib is used to
visualize data’’ and ‘‘scikit learn was used to pre-process
data and perform machine learning’’.
• Data: The dataset, which is used, is taken from IEEE
Dataport [33]. This dataset has medical details of
1190 patients, which have their details recorded. They
may or may not have heart-related disease. The dataset
has various attributes, like, age, sex, chest pain type
(ranging from 1 to 4), resting bp, cholesterol levels,
resting ECG level, whether that patient has got heart
disease or not. The dataset is prepared for the machine
learning process by splitting the data in 70%- 30% for
training and testing tasks. After that, the implementation
of various models to classify and predict the possibility
of ‘‘getting a heart attack’’ is done.
• Used machine learning algorithms: The machine
learning algorithms like, decision tree, support vector machine (SVM), and logistic regression, which are
closely associated with this task, are considered. The
summary of these algorithms is given below.
• Decision tree algorithm: The decision tree algorithm
is a supervised learning technique, which is used
to solve problems like classification and regression.
It is, nonetheless, preferred for classification problems.
In this algorithm, the internal nodes represent dataset
attributes, branches represent decision rules, and each
leaf node provides the outcome in this tree-structured
classifier. The decision node and the leaf node are the
two sorts of nodes. The decision nodes are used to make
any decision and have numerous branches, whereas the
leaf nodes are the decisions’ outputs and do not have
any more branches. The decisions are made based on the
characteristics of the dataset [34].
• Support vector machine: Support vector machine
(SVM) is very popular supervised learning algorithm.
Usually, people prefer to use SVM as it generates
great accuracy while using less computing power. SVM
can be used for regression as well as classification.
However, it is widely used in classification tasks. The
goal of the SVM algorithm is to find a hyperplane in
an N-dimensional space that classify data points clearly.
The hyperplane’s size is determined by the number of
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features. If there are only two input features, the hyperplane is merely a line. When the number of input features
reaches three, the hyperplane transforms into a twodimensional plane. If the number of input features is
three, then the hyperplane becomes a 2-D plane. However, it becomes difficult to imagine when the number
of features exceeds three. The hyperplane is the optimal
decision boundary in SVM. SVM chooses the extreme
points or vectors, which further help in creating the
hyperplane. These extreme cases are refers as the support vectors [35], [36].
• Logistic regression: Logistic regression is a supervised learning classification algorithm used to predict
the probability of a target variable. In this algorithm,
the nature of target (dependent variable) is dichotomous. It indicates that there would be only two possible
classes. For example, the dependent variable is binary
in nature having data coded as either 1 (i.e., in case
of success or yes) or 0 (i.e., in case of failure or
no). It is one of the simplest machine learning algorithms, which is used for various classification problems for example, cancer detection, spam detection,
etc., [37].
During the implementation and analysis following results
are obtained.
1) COMPUTATION TIME

It is the time, which is required for a particular model to
predict about something. For a ‘‘good prediction system,’’ its
value should be as less as possible. The values of computation time (seconds) for decision tree, support vector machine
(SVM), and logistic regression are 0.19, 0.23, and 0.27,
respectively. Hence, it is clear that decision tree method has
taken the lesser time than the other considered techniques.
The different values of computation time under different
techniques are given in Figure 7.
2) ACCURACY

It is one of the important matrices, it is the measure of all the
correctly identified cases. For a ‘‘good prediction system,’’ its
value should be as high as possible. We have computed the
accuracy of ‘‘getting a heart attack’’ for the various considered techniques. The different values of accuracy for decision
tree, support vector machine (SVM) and logistic regression
are 84.24%, 87.57%, and 85.20%, respectively. From these
values, it is clear that accuracy is high in case of SVM. The
different values of accuracy under different techniques are
given in Figure 8.
From the obtained results, it has been clear that the performance of SVM is better than other techniques as it achieves
high accuracy with less computation time (refer Figure 7 and
Figure 8).
VIII. CONCLUSION

An IoMT environment suffers from different security and privacy related issues because it can be attacked through various
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methods. Under the presence of these attacks, the sensitive
health data can be leaked or altered. Therefore, we need a
strong security mechanism to mitigate these attacks in IoMT.
Hence, a new AI-enabled secure communication protocol
for an IoMT environment has been presented. The discussed
network and threat models of the proposed ASCP-IoMT
provided the details of the arrangements of various network
devices and the associated attacks of the IoMT. The conducted security analysis proved the security of ASCP-IoMT
against various potential attacks. During the comparative performance analysis, it has been observed that the proposed
ASCP-IoMT provides better security with additional functionality features as compared to existing similar techniques.
The pragmatic study of ASCP-IoMT was then provided to
find out ASCP-IoMT’s influence on the considered parameters. In future, we would like to add more functionality
features (i.e., Blockchain) to the presented scheme.
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